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ABSTRACT 
 
The Quality of Government (QoG) research program has to date justified the importance of politi-
cal context in the form of party system type, electoral rules, and political fractionalization for un-
derstanding variation in QoG. Arguments about social fragmentation (be that ethnic, class or racial) 
are also related to governmental outcomes. I propose to contribute to this research program by 
examining the relationship between party system polarization, as measured by the variation of par-
ties’ policy positions (VPP), and quality of government. I argue that party system polarization can 
explain short and medium term intra-country variation in QoG. Specifically, party system polarization 
should decrease QoG. My theory suggests two reasons for this expectation. First, party system polariza-
tion increases incentives for partiality by the bureaucracy and government institutions, and this has 
subsequent implications for state efficiency. Second, political consensus enhances cooperation 
among political actors, and thus the government’s ability to pursue beneficial reform strategies.  
Findings suggest that this effect is present but conditional upon a country’s experience with democ-
racy. 
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The causes and consequences of a virtuous circle whereby countries build and maintain in-
stitutions conducive to what has been termed Quality of Government (QoG) has been the focus of 
much scholarly attention. Good governance is related to a multitude of economic and non econom-
ic outcomes: economic growth, social justice, equality, political trust are all outcomes related to 
levels of QoG. It is, therefore, important to identify and track sources of said outcomes.i 
 A number of country specific factors have been deemed relevant in this sort of studies. 
Cultural approaches suggest, for example, that corruption (one of the defining characteristics of 
government quality) is strongly related to embedded social norms related to gift giving and loyalty 
to the clan or family (Banﬁeld, 1958, Wertheim, 1970; Heidenheimer 1994). From a development 
perspective studies have suggested that, even though the direction of causality is not wholly clear, it 
is a stable finding that high economic development correlates with good governance outcomes (La 
Porta et al. 1999; Treisman 2007). The variation of political institutions across countries is also 
related to variations in QoG. Democracies in general, tend to be less corrupt regimes, but scholars 
suggest that this relationship is not as straightforward as one might think (Montinola & Jackman, 
2002; Charron & Lapuente, 2010).  Among democratic regimes, distinctions between presidential-
ism and parliamentarism and electoral rules, such as the electoral formula are also sources of QoG 
(Panizza, 2001;Persson et al., 2003; and Kunicova & Rose Ackerman, 2005; Charron, 2011). Finally, 
social fragmentation can also lead to suboptimal governmental outcomes. For instance, La Porta 
et., al (1999) demonstrate that ethnic fractionalization does matter for QoG (see also, Alesina et al., 
1999). 
It is to the latter two parts of the literature that this study aims to contribute to. In this pa-
per I examine whether QoG is related to the variation of party policy positions (VPP) on offer in a 
political system. While a number of other variables, that reflect political context, have been consid-
ered in the QoG literature, little attention has been paid to the actual ‘shape’ of party competition 
(but see Brown et al., 2011). By ‘shape’ I mean the compactness or not of the policy space (Alvarez 
and Nagler, 2004). I argue here, that polarized (or dispersed) political systems, in terms of policy, 
lack the necessary cooperation essential for reform and in some situations might encourage and 
increase clientelism through the excessive politicisation of the bureaucracy. As such, a situation of a 
dispersed policy space might be detrimental to state efficiency and  to QoG.  From a practical 
standpoint, an attractive feature of considering VPP as a contextual correlate, is that it is one of the 
few ‘political’ variables that lends itself to an intra country, cross-time research design (as opposed 
to the type of electoral system, for example, which generally does not exhibit high levels of intra 
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country variation). Thus the addition of VPP complements the contextual ‘picture’ regarding re-
search on the political correlates of QoG (see for example, Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman 2005; 
Charron 2011).  
I examine the above propositions combining data on parties policy positions generated 
from party manifestos and data on QoG from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The 
sample includes 39 countries and the time frame is from 1984 to 2009. I employ a Time Series 
Cross Sectional (TSCS) design for my analysis. Results in the full set of countries do not, initially, 
confirm my expectations. However, the relationship between polarization and QoG seems to be 
conditional upon the years of a country’s democratic experience. Younger democracies do exhibit a 
negative correlation between policy dispersion and levels quality of government. 
This paper is organized into five sections. I first present the theoretical arguments that 
support the polarization hypothesis. I proceed with a review of the data used to test this hypothesis. 
In the third section I present the results from different TSCS models and in the fourth section I 
proceed to a modification of my original hypothesis in the light of this results and test it again. I 
conclude with a discussion of these findings and the further steps that I believe this research pro-
ject should take. 
 
Theoretical Considerations  
My theory explaining why polarization decreases QoG comes in two parts. First, in situa-
tions of increased polarization, political elites have greater incentives to be partial in their exercise of 
public administration, or to take politicization of bureaucratic posts to an extreme, in order to forti-
fy policy implementation and prevent obstructions. In a polarized environment, parties and gov-
ernments might have greater incentives to engage in clientelistic practices which will affect, for 
example, civil service recruitment. A purging of senior civil servants will follow government turno-
ver, the division between administration and politics will become less prevalent and this will have 
subsequent undesirable effects for continuity in public administration and efficiency. There is a 
caveat to this argument. The above are conditional on the discretion that a government has on 
recruitment and the set of rules governing administration practices. It is also related to how the 
‘game’ has been played out in the political arena. If  previous administrations (governments) have 
behaved in a similar manner then the next one is more likely to engage into the same practice. This 
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will ensure the continuation of a vicious circle which will be very difficult to disrupt. 
Second, elite consensus on policy issues is likely to increase legislative cooperation and fa-
cilitates policy reform and implementation. Administrative reform, for example, is also more likely 
to occur under circumstances of consensus rather than polarisation as costs for politicians are re-
duced. Policy agreement is not necessarily beneficial for QoG but to the extent that this coopera-
tion extends to other political actors (e.g public sector unions) it could help to solve ‘dilemmas’ and 
deal with problems of collective action.  Socioeconomic development ultimately rests on nations' 
ability to pursue reform, political economic or administrative (Geddes, 1991; Krueger,1993; Rodrik, 
1993, 1996; Treisman, 2007). However, as McCarty, Poole & Rosenthal (2006:176–183) point out, 
polarization negatively affects policy change and law production. Evidence from anti-corruption 
reform policies in Sub Saharan Africa also suggested that high policy disagreement between veto 
players and other stakeholders (especially as the number of the second group increases) does have a 
negative effect on reform (Torenvliedad and Haarhuis, 2008). Similarly, strong competition be-
tween anti-communist and ex-communist factions in post communist countries in the 1990s has 
reduced economic performance and growth (Frye, 2002). 
The above literature emphasizes two mechanisms through which polarisation relates to in-
ferior outcomes in terms of policy performance and reform. First, high political fragmentation 
makes it difficult for elites to put together the policy 'coalitions' necessary for reform. In that setting 
the government turnover leads to a revision of previous policy and consequently no side is able to 
implement a coherent policy program across time. Second in a highly polarized environment gov-
ernment commitment on policy is less credible increasing uncertainty. If, for instance, businesses 
and firms expect large swings in policy with a change in government, then they have fewer incen-
tives either for investment or timely compliance (Frye, 2002). 
Similar arguments come from the 'public goods' literature and in relation to other sources 
of social divisions. It is well documented, for example, that social fragmentation and polarization 
(be that racial, ethnic or class related) impedes the effective provision of public goods and stifles 
growth. Share of spending on productive public goods is inversely related to ethic fragmentation or 
diversity (Alesina et al., 1999, Easterly and Levin,1997).  In cases of extreme political polarization 
my theory suggests that parties and governments are likely to engage in more ‘concentrated’ and 
exclusive provision of public goods in order to solidify support among their own ranks. 
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The polarisation hypothesis reflects the above the theoretical considerations. 
H1: Increases in the variation of parties policy positions in a political system will result in decreasing levels 
of QoG. 
 
I should note that similar and recent research has theoretically specified, tested and confirmed ex-
actly the opposite of what my theoretical framework and hypothesis propose (Brown et al., 2007). 
In a recent piece Brown et., al argue that polarization increased incentives by politicians to expose 
corrupt practices, while ideological similarity will encourage collusion between parties. Therefore, in 
that issue area, polarisation might have a beneficial effect(Brown et al., 2007:1517).  Governments 
faced with oppositions placed at the extreme seem to be perceived less corrupt than governments 
with an opposition place closer to the middle of the political spectrum (ibid:1517).  As it is the case, 
in my paper, Brown and colleagues move the focus from formal rules (such the electoral system) to 
actual ‘politics’. I will not engage in a detailed critique of the paper. Suffice is to say that the opera-
tionalization of polarization, the dependent variable, the time frame and methods employed can 
account for the  differences in the results. Most importantly, the aforementioned study employs 
perceptions of corruption instead of the hard measure (see below) and does not take into account 
the full variation of (weighted) policy positions in the political system as a whole, but rather a more 
summary measure of government vs opposition.  
 
Data and Methods 
Measuring the Dependent variable 
The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), published by the PRS Group provide 
measures of the key dependent variable. As the ‘mission statement’ on their website reads, “On a 
monthly basis since 1980, ICRG has produced political, economic, and financial risk ratings for 
countries important to international business. ICRG now monitors 140 countries” (see, 
http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG.aspx). It is this depth of coverage in terms of time, that make 
the  ICRG data such a valuable source for the purposes of this paper. The research design aims to 
uncover relationships in the main variables of interest intra country and across time. Therefore, 
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time frame of data availability is a key consideration. With 140 countries included cross national 
variation is not a issue. While ICRG data are not primarily aimed for academic use, but rather they 
are mainly tools to make decisions on ‘safe’ international investment, they do feature in studies 
published in top academic journals and their use among researchers in political science and econo-
my is by now widespread (see, Charon, 2011 for a review).  
I use most available ICRG indicators. The freely available ICRG data are an index com-
prised by expert evaluations on three main aspects of Quality of Government:  Bureaucratic Effi-
ciency, Corruption and Law and Order. In the models below I employ the ICRG corruption index, 
along with the indicator of Bureaucratic Quality and the full ICRG QoG Index (based on a combi-
nation of the three indices above). 
Other available indicators such as the Corruptions Perceptions Index (CPI) published by 
Transparency International have been considered. However, I have decided against their use, due to 
data limitations (ICRG gives a larger time frame) but also conceptual considerations (the hard 
measure is for the purposes of this study, I believe, more appropriate).   
 
Measuring the Key Independent Variable: Average Party Policy Polarisation 
To measure party policy positions over time, I employ estimates from the Comparative 
Manifesto Project (CMP).  These data are comprised of party manifestos from the main political 
parties in more than 50 countries in the post-war period and provide the only longitudinal and 
cross-national estimates of party policies.  The analytical payoff of the CMP data is that it allows us 
to map party positions over a large time frame and in a multitude of political contexts. Moreover, as 
the content of party programmes is often the result of intense intra-party debate, the CMP 
estimates should be reliable and accurate statements about parties’ positions at the time of 
elections.  Indeed, these measures are generally consistent with those from other party positioning 
studies, such as those based on expert placements, citizen perceptions of parties’ positions, and 
parliamentary voting analyses.  This provides additional confidence in the longitudinal and cross-
national reliability of these estimates (see Hearl 2001; Laver, Benoit, and Garry 2003).ii 
 While the methods used by the CMP to map party policy positions have been at 
length discussed in various publications, I briefly review these methods here.iii  Under the CMP 
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framework, policy preferences are characterized by systematic examination of party stances on poli-
cies based on content analysis of election programmes (Budge et al. 2001).  Individual coders isolate 
“quasi-sentences” in a party’s policy programme and pair them with policy categories (e.g. educa-
tion, defence, law and order, morality, etc.) using a pre-established, common classification scheme. 
The classification scheme is made up of fifty-six categories and the percentages of each category 
provide the basis for estimating the policy priorities of a party. The Left-Right ideological scores for 
parties’ policy programmes (used here) range from -100 (extreme left) to +100 (extreme right). I 
note that I have recalibrated the CMP estimates to fit on the conventional 1-10 Eurobarometer 
scale.iv      
In constructing a measure of dispersion, scholars present different arguments about 
whether or not the parties’ positions should be weighted by their size (see Alvarez and Nagler 2004; 
Ezrow and Xezonakis, 2011).v  Both of these arguments appear reasonable, and, consequently, 
below I report empirical analyses for both weighted and unweighted measures of party system dis-
persion. The weighted measure of average party policy polarisation  is defined as follows:  
 
Weighted Average Party Polarisation = 

j1
 VS jk (P jk - Pk)2                         (1)                 
where, 
Pk = the weighted mean Left-Right ideological placement off all parties in country k.  
Pjk = the ideological position of party j in country k.  
VSjk = vote share for party j in country k.  
 
The alternative to weighing parties’ positions by their vote shares is to weight all parties 
equally.  This measure is the unweighted measure of the average party policy polarisation, and it is con-
structed as follows:  
Unweighted Average Party Polarisation = 
n
Pkjk
1j
2)- (P 
                             (2) 
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Control Variables 
Three additional variables are used in the models presented below, effective number of parties, 
level of economic development (measured here by Gross Domestic Product) and years the country 
has been a democracy. All three have been theoretically and empirically associated with QoG. In 
some of these cases the direction of that effect is counterintuitive or the direction of causality is 
hardly straightforward.   
The latter is the case for the measure of socio economic development.  Lack of corruption, 
respect for the rule of law and an effective bureaucracy have been shown to be strongly related to 
per capita income (Kaufmann et, al. 1999).  Others have claimed that in order to establish institu-
tions of QoG a certain level of socioeconomic development is needed first (Goldsmith, 2007). 
Issues of endogeneity are of course of some concern, but it is not among the purposes of this paper 
to take a stand in this chicken and egg debate. I consider a country’s wealth to be a legitimate and 
essential control variable in order to test the polarisation thesis not least because it is among the 
variables which exhibit across time intra country variation. 
Institutions associated to liberal democracy, such as an independent judiciary and respect 
for the rule of law should impose constrains on corrupt behavior by public servants and politicians 
alike. It has been demonstrated empirically  that this relationship is quite complex. It can have a 
curvilinear function (Montinolla and Jackman, 2005, Charron and Lapuente, 2010) or democracy 
might actually weaken government quality initially in newly established democracies (McMillan and 
Zoido, 2004; see also, Rothstein 2011).  I do not employ here a measure of democracy which re-
flects overall democratic performance. I rather employ a straightforward count of the years the 
country has been a democracy. In this kind of empirical design years of democracy is a variable that 
has been deemed necessary in similar studies (see for example, Charron, 2011; Keefer, 2007) and as 
such it is included here as an additional control variable. 
Since the compactness of the policy space (or polarisation) is also related to the number of 
viable political parties in a party system, a control variable that measures that feature of the political 
context is needed. I use hear the Effective Number of Electoral Parties calculated with the Lakso 
and Taagepera(1979) formula. Between 1984 and 2000 I use data from Golder (2005), and for the 
subsequent year I employ data from Gallagher and Mitchell (2008). 
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Testing the Polarisation Hypothesis 
Estimating the parameters of the model specification below (Equation 3) will provide a test 
of H1.  
 
QoG (t)   = B0 + B1 [VPP (t)] + B2-n [Controls] + QoG (t-1)   + e                  (3). 
H1: B1 < 0 
The analysis encompassed about 212 election year in 40 countries between 1984 and 2009 
(see Appendix for the list of countries).vi  The data are best characterized as time-series cross-
sectional (TSCS) as the set of observations include an average of 4 election measurements per 
country.  Estimating a simple regression on the TSCS data can lead to erroneous conclusions if 
there are unobserved differences between countries (Hsiao 2003; Green et al. 2001). Thus I 
estimate country-specific effects to ensure that unobserved differences between countries are not 
driving the major findings. I estimate country-specific effects because the theoretical underpinnings 
of this study focus on intra-country and over-time variation of the dependent variable (rather than 
cross-national variation).vii Given the structure of the data, serially correlated errors within countries 
is a possibility. That is, the causal processes which generate the QoG score at t, could also be 
operating at election t-1. Thus, treating these observations as independent could be a problem. As 
such, corrections for first order autocorrelation such as the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable 
in the model are necessary. I include the country’s score on the ICRG index in the previous 
election year (t-1) for the parameter estimates in the model specifications that I report.  
Table 1 below summarizes the results for the basic specification. There are three different 
models that have been run using both the weighted and unweighted measure of polarisation. The 
first model is a bivariate regression between the ICRG corruption index (higher values in this varia-
ble indicate less corruption) and the measures of polarisation (all these models have been run using 
the both the full ICRG index and the ICRG measure of bureaucratic quality and results remain 
unchanged). In the next two models I include the lagged dependent and independent variables. The 
lagged dependent variable is included here for methodological reasons as mentioned before and the 
lagged dependent mainly for theoretical reasons as it could be the case that there is a lagged effect 
of polarisation.  In none of the three specifications do the measures of polarisation (weighted or 
unweighted, lagged or not) reach a level of statistical significance. The previous levels of QoG do 
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exert a positive influence on future levels as expected. 
TABLE 1. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES OF ICRG CORRUPTION INDEX AND SYSTEM POLARISATION 
 
  
Bivariate Lagged Dependent Variable Lagged Independent Variable 
 
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted 
              
Party System  
Polarisation(t) 0.10 0.13 -0.09 -0.21 -0.08 -0.21 
 
(0.29) (0.27) (0.22) (0.18) (0.22) (0.18) 
ICRG(t-1) 
  
0.38*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 
   
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
Party System  
Polarisation(t-1) 
    
-0.03 0.01 
     
(0.19) (0.18) 
Constant 4.33*** 4.32*** 2.68*** 2.74*** 2.70*** 2.74*** 
 
(0.22) (0.18) (0.36) (0.33) (0.39) (0.35) 
       
Observations 213 213 172 172 172 172 
R-squared (overall) 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
       
Notes. *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01. two-tailed test; Dependent variable is the ICRG Corruption Index (higher values in 
this variable indicate less corruption). All models include country specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
“Weighted” and “Unweighted” refer to the weighted and unweighted measures of polarisation being employed in the model specifi-
cation, and are calculated as in equations 1 and 2 in text.  
 
Similar is the picture in Table 2 where I add more contextual variables. The first model in-
cludes the effective number of parties as a control. In the second, economic development, meas-
ured here by Growth is included. The third model incorporates the full set of independent varia-
bles. Years of democracy have been added to this last model. Again in no models do the VPP 
measures achieve any acceptable level of statistical significance. As regards the additional variables 
Growth seems to be related negatively with QoG. When years of democracy is included in the full 
model, however, this is the only significant influence recorded. Both of these results are subject to 
further investigation when additional sensitivity checks are added to the analysis. I should note that 
the inclusion of a squared term for the years of democracy do not change these results. Neither 
does the inclusion of measures of government fractionalisation or type of electoral system. 
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TABLE 2. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES OF ICRG CORRUPTION  INDEX AND SYSTEM POLARISATION 
  
Effective Number of Parties Economic Growth Full Model (years of democracy 
included) 
 
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted 
              
Party System Polarisa-
tion(t) -0.09 -0.21 -0.21 -0.32 -0.11 -0.27 
 
(0.23) (0.19) (0.26) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) 
ICRG(t-1) 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.05 0.05 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
Effective Number of 
Parties(t) 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.02 0.02 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
Economic Growth(t)  
  
-1.57** -1.64** -0.66 -0.73 
   
(0.76) (0.72) (0.60) (0.58) 
Years of Democracy(t) 
    
-0.07*** -0.07*** 
     
(0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 2.73*** 2.77*** 3.12*** 3.17*** 7.53*** 7.61*** 
 
(0.42) (0.40) (0.68) (0.66) (0.82) (0.80) 
       
Observations 168 168 155 155 155 155 
R-squared (overall) 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.41 0.42 
       
Notes. *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01. two-tailed test; Dependent variable is the ICRG Corruption Index (higher values in 
this variable indicate less corruption).  All models include country specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
“Weighted” and “Unweighted” refer to the weighted and unweighted measures of polarisation being employed in the model specifi-
cation, and are calculated as in equations 1 and 2 in text.  
 
Overall the results are not encouraging for the polarisation hypothesis. In none of the tests above 
did VPP appear to exert a significant effect on QoG. However, in all the specifications the sign of 
the coefficient was the one expected, that is negative.  
 
Modifying the Polarisation Hypothesis 
One could argue that a casual reading of some of the available data could provide a clue as 
to why H1 seems to support the null. For example, the case of Denmark a country with high scores 
in QoG indicators presents a large variation in terms of policy positions. Indeed cases like Den-
mark are the ones that drive a positive effect of dispersion on QoG in a simple cross country 
pooled regression, exactly the opposite of what my hypothesis specifies. Another consideration is 
that our data on QoG do not go further back than 1984. To the degree that corruption or the ab-
sence of it, is “sticky” (Rothstein, 2011), it is difficult to argue that countries with a long history of 
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established institutions conducive to good governance would exhibit changes in QoG according to 
the compactness or not of the policy space. On the other hand countries that are still on their way 
(and the struggle) to achieve high quality of governance would provide a more appropriate set to 
test the hypothesis.  
The other defining characteristic of Denmark, along with the handful of other countries in the 
sample, is that it has the longest experience with democracy. As of 2007 (the last election year 
available in my data) Denmark had 77 uninterrupted democratic years. As I have mentioned 
before the relationship between democracy and QoG is complicated but one could plausibly 
expect that experience with democracy will alter the way that both elites and citizens interpret 
situations of polarisation. In established democracies, in the long run, policy outputs tend to 
be centred around the median voter (McDonald and Budge, 2005). Therefore successive gov-
ernments have less need to protect policy implementation in the way specified by my theory 
since both the citizens preferences and the competition among parties has in some sense ‘set-
tled’ around the median voter with small overtime deviations.  If you add to that a consensual 
culture whereby policy differences are smoothed out inside government coalitions then again 
this does not encourage the behaviour I have described my theory.  
However, one could argue that in younger democracies whereby competition is still much 
more volatile and swings in voters preferences more abrupt, successive governments a) need 
to respond quicker to the voter coalitions that brought them to power and b) probably are 
faced with demands that diverge much more from the status quo than is the case in estab-
lished democracies. Previous research has highlighted the curvilinear relationship between 
democracy and quality of government (Keefer, 2007). As the argument goes, the inability of 
political actors to make credible pre-electoral promises to voters will result in inferior perfor-
mance outcomes (Keefer, 2007:804). I argue here that diverge positions on policy will exacer-
bate the credibility problem. 
I propose therefore that a country’s experience with democracy might condition the relation-
ship between polarisation and QoG. In Table 3 below I include in the full model specification 
an interaction term between the variables “years of democracy” and “polarisation”. Both the 
main and the interaction effect for polarisation is significant for the weighted dispersion mod-
el, but not the unweighted. The signs of the two coefficients, in the weighted model, suggest 
that when democratic experience in a country is short (main effect) polarisation tends to de-
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crease QoG. The sign of the interaction suggests that as the history of electoral democracy 
becomes longer the same effect tends to become positive, but is very close to zero. Graphing 
the marginal effect of polarisation over the years of democracy provides more information. In 
Figure 1 the marginal effect of VPP on QoG appears to be negative and significant in younger 
democracies. As a country experiences more additional democratic years, the effect turns posi-
tive but as the confidence intervals suggest it is not distinguishable from zero. This conditional 
polarisation hypothesis appears to fit the data better. I should also note that in 12 out of the 
14 specification presented above, the polarisation coefficient (both weighted and unweighted) 
has the hypothesized negative sign. 
TABLE 3. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES OF ICRG CORRUPTION INDEX AND SYSTEM POLARISATION 
CONDITIONAL ON DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE 
   
 
Unweighted Weighted 
      
Party System Polarisation(t) 
-0.59 -1.07*** 
 
(0.36) (0.29) 
ICRG(t-1) 0.04 0.02 
 
(0.09) (0.09) 
Effective Number of Parties(t) 0.02 0.04 
 
(0.07) (0.07) 
Growth(t)  -0.64 -0.78 
 
(0.57) (0.51) 
Years of Democracy(t) -0.08*** -0.09*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Years of Democracy*Polarisation(t) 0.01 0.02** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 7.97*** 8.35*** 
 
(0.80) (0.82) 
   
Observations 155 155 
R-squared (overall) 0.42 0.44 
   
Notes. *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01. two-tailed test; Dependent variable is the ICRG Corruption 
Index (higher values in this variable indicate less corruption).  All models include country specific fixed ef-
fects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. “Weighted” and “Unweighted” refer to the weighted and 
unweighted measures of polarisation being employed in the model specification, and are calculated as in equa-
tions 1 and 2 in text.  
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FIGURE 1. THE CONDITIONAL EFFECT OF POLARISATION ON QoG. 
 
 
 
Discussion 
In this paper I have argued that the ‘shape’ of party competition in a political system 
is a contextual political variable neglected so far in research regarding the determinants of 
QoG. I suggested that taking into account the compactness or not of the policy space, having 
therefore another measure of political fragmentation and conflict, is a relevant variable that 
can add to our understanding about the mechanisms that lead to inferior governmental out-
comes or not. I suggested two mechanisms through which polarisation might affect QoG.  
First, in a polarized environment, parties and governments might have greater incentives to 
overtly politicize the bureaucracy or engage in clientelistic practices which will affect, for ex-
ample, civil service recruitment and accordingly state continuity and efficiency. Second, elite 
consensus on policy issues is likely to increase legislative cooperation and facilitates policy 
reform, implementation and governments’ policy commitment credibility. 
The results do not initially suggest that this is the case. While I do obtain the expected 
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sign for the coefficient in my models in none of those is this effect significant. However, a 
conditional effect between VPP and QoG seems to be at work here. Younger democracies 
tend to be susceptible to less compact political spaces as regards indicators of QoG. 
Admittedly there is a necessity to shore up the “conditional” argument further in 
terms of theory and evidence . The argument as it is right now suggests that the distribution of 
voters preferences, and especially how this distribution changes through time, might be rele-
vant. Data that can combine measures of parties’ policy positions along with voters are sparse 
but they are definitely not non-existent. This would be a way to test whether governments’ are 
adversely constrained in their behaviour due to large swings in voters’ preferences. 
So far this paper hasn’t addressed the potential ‘elephant in the room’: that is the di-
rection of causality. It could be the case that the causal arrows run from the QoG to polarisa-
tion and not in the other way round. One rationale could be the following. Badly governed 
societies are usually societies where inequality is rampant. This would increase redistributive 
demands and facilitate the electoral success of fringe parties. The policy space would inevitably 
expand as a result of that. At this point I can say that in the set of countries and years at hand 
there does not seem to be a correlation between inequality and polarisation.viii  
For the future I intend to continue work in this project by focusing on two main is-
sues. One is extrapolating the polarisation data in non-election years. This would not only 
increase the number of cases but would also provide me with more balanced panels making 
analysis easier and methodologically sounder. The other would be possibly to focus on policy 
dimensions, other than the economic as I do here, to calculate compactness of the policy 
space. In that case maybe switching to a measure of policy performance (so that performance 
on alternative policy areas can be assessed), would be advisable.   
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i  The presence of impartial institutions, respect for the rule of law and a non corrupt bureaucracy are 
identified for the purposes of this study as indicators of quality. In this paper I am not going to dwell 
much on the important aspect of the literature which in effect defining the concept (Rothstein and 
Teorell, 2008) 
ii Debate exists over which approach (e.g., expert opinions, citizen perceptions, or codings of mani-
festos) is the most accurate for measuring parties’ policy positions. A special issue of Electoral Studies 
analyzes the tradeoffs that accompany each of these approaches (Marks 2007). I rely on the CMP 
data because the dataset covers a longer time period than the alternatives.   
iii For a more thorough description of the coding process, see Appendix 2 in Budge et al. (2001).  
iv I recalibrated the CMP estimates to fit on 1-10 scale using the following equation: (CMP estimate 
  9/200) + 5.5.   
v The argument for weighting party system dispersion by party size is that such weighting accounts 
for the fact that the small parties in some countries have virtually no political influence.  The argu-
ments for relying on an unweighted measure of party system dispersion are that a parties’ policy 
influence does not necessarily correlate with vote (or seat) share. Additionally, small parties provide 
a vehicle through which voters can express their policy preferences, regardless of whether or not 
such parties significantly influence government policy outputs. 
 
vii Hausman tests on the models reported below suggest that a fixed effects estimator is both efficient 
and more consistent than a random effects one. 
viii A simple bivariate regression between the GINI Index of inequality and polarization did not 
return significant results. 
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Appendix 
 
TABLE A1. LIST OF COUNTRIES AND TIME FRAME 
Country Election Years 
Albania 1990-2001 
Australia 1984-2007 
Austria 1986-2002 
Belgium 1985-2003 
Bulgaria 1990-2009 
Canada 1984-2006 
Croatia 1990-2007 
Czech Republic 1990-2002 
Denmark 1984-2007 
Estonia 1992-2003 
France 1986-2007 
Germany 1990-2009 
Greece 1985-2000 
Hungary 1990-2002 
Iceland 1991-2003 
Ireland 1987-2007 
Israel 1984-1999 
Italy 1987-2006 
Japan 1986-2003 
Luxembourg 1984-1999 
Macedonia 1990-2002 
Malta 1996-1998 
Mexico 1985-2000 
Montenegro 1990-2002 
Netherlands 1986-2003 
New Zealand 1984-2008 
Norway 1985-2001 
Poland 1991-2007 
Portugal 1985-2009 
Romania 1990-2008 
Russia 1993-2007 
Slovakia 1990-2006 
Slovenia 1990-2008 
Spain 1986-2008 
Sweden 1985-2006 
Switzerland 1987-2003 
Turkey 1987-2002 
United Kingdom 1987-2005 
United States 1984-2008 
 
